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1While humanity faces a range of interconnected 
transnational threats and crises in the 21st Century—
including extreme poverty, hunger, pandemic disease 
and demographic change—climate change and the 
continued existence of nuclear weapons stand out as 
the two principal threats to the survival of humani-
ty. On the long arc of human existence, both threats 
are relatively new to the scene, having only appeared 
over the last century. Both threaten the survival of life 
on earth as we know it and both are of our making.
As part of its Climate-Nuclear Nexus project, the 
World Future Council (WFC) released in 2012 a re-
port on ‘Climate Change, Nuclear Risks and Nuclear 
Disarmament: From Security Threats to Sustainable 
Peace’. In the report, Prof. Dr. Jürgen Scheffran of the 
University of Hamburg in Germany exposes the in-
terplay between climate change and risks associat-
ed with nuclear weapons, facilities and materials, in 
order to broaden understanding of how these perils 
interact with each other, and considers how forging 
sustainable solutions in one field could trigger action 
in the other. 
Since the report’s release, the WFC has organised 
workshops and prepared briefings for policy-makers, 
academics and civil society organisations on these 
important linkages. Developments over the last three 
years have prompted us to update the report and re-
lease it at a time when negotiations and initiatives for 
tackling the climate and nuclear threat are reaching 
a critical stage. 
Climate change-induced extreme weather events 
such as floods, storms, droughts and heatwaves are 
occurring with rising regularity, resulting in the 
death and displacement of thousands of people. 
Furthermore, there has been increased recognition 
among defence and security establishments that cli-
mate change poses an urgent and growing threat to 
global peace and stability, as it has the potential to 
exacerbate many other challenges. 
At the UN Climate Change Conference in Paris in De-
cember 2015 (COP 21), all 195 participating nations 
reached an unprecedented agreement on climate 
change. The Paris Agreement sets out a global ac-
tion plan to peak greenhouse gas emissions as soon 
as possible and avoid dangerous climate change by 
limiting global warming to well below 2°C with the 
aim to limit the increase to 1.5°C, since this would 
significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate 
change. 
Meanwhile, calls from a majority of states for a le-
gally binding instrument or package of measures to 
achieve the universal prohibition and elimination of 
nuclear weapons—a goal as old as the nuclear age—
have languished. Despite a recent series of interven-
tions setting out the vision of a world free of nuclear 
weapons by high-level statesmen—including from 
the nuclear armed-states—concrete action toward its 
achievement has lagged, although this has the possi-
bility to change with a new process for nuclear disar-
mament deliberations and negotiations having been 
established by the UN General Assembly in Novem-
ber 2015.
This lack of progress on nuclear disarmament has 
been starkly contrasted by a renewed focus on the 
catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and 
recent revelations on the kaleidoscope of risks in-
herent to nuclear policies and postures. The sobering 
conclusions are that: a) as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, their use, whether accidental or intentional, 
will be a matter of when, not if; b) any use of nuclear 
weapons in a populated area would have catastroph-
ic consequences on human health, the environment, 
infrastructure and political stability; and c) the use of 
just a small percentage of the global nuclear arsenal 
FOREWORD
“The two perils have a great deal in common. Both are the fruit 
of swollen human power—in the one case, the destructive power 
of war; in the other, the productive power of fossil-fuel energy. 
Both put stakes on the table of a magnitude never present before 
in human decision making. Both threaten life on a planetary 
scale. Both require a fully global response. 
Anyone concerned by the one should be concerned with 
the other. It would be a shame to save the Earth from slowly 
warming only to burn it up in an instant in a nuclear war.”
— JONATHAN SCHELL,  “THE SEVENTH DECADE: THE NEW SHAPE OF NUCLEAR DANGER”
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would create climatic consequences that dwarf the 
current and projected impact of carbon emissions. 
Despite an increased understanding of the climate 
and nuclear threat and a growing urgency for action 
on both fronts, little attention has been given to how 
they may interact with each other. That is where this 
report aims to make a contribution. 
This updated report considers how both threats can 
have grave implications for global and human securi-
ty and how they may interact with each other, there-
by exacerbating other crises. It further examines the 
possible effects of nuclear explosions on the climate, 
as well as the consequences of climate change and 
extreme weather events on nuclear security. The re-
port also exposes the pitfalls of including nuclear en-
ergy as an alternative to fossil fuels to curb climate 
change, and the nuclear weapon-proliferation risks of 
nuclear energy programmes. Finally, it reviews mech-
anisms and initiatives to neutralise both threats and 
considers how success in one area could benefit ac-
tion in the other. 
We must also recognise that for a rising number of 
people, the effects of these two threats are not a the-
oretical, future issue of concern. Behind the facts 
and figures are stories of real suffering from climate 
change and nuclear weapons programmes.
The plight of one group in particular is illustrative of 
the human impact of the nuclear enterprise and cli-
mate change. The inhabitants of the remote Pacific 
island chain of Bikini Atoll were forced from their 
homes in the 1940s so that the United States could 
test its atomic bombs there, bringing with it a lega-
cy of transgenerational effects of radiation exposure, 
including high cancer rates, birth deformities and 
environmental poisoning. The lands they had called 
home were declared uninhabitable. Now, the tiny 
patches of earth they were relocated to in the Mar-
shall Islands are at risk of suffering the same fate, 
as rising sea levels are breaching sea walls, washing 
over their islands, killing crops and forcing the Bikini 
Atoll refugees to consider relocating again—this time 
to foreign continents thousands of miles away. Their 
experience should serve as a cautionary tale. If we 
don’t seize the opportunities soon to rid the world of 
these threats, we will drift toward a similar fate.
ROB	vAN	RIET 
Coordinator, Peace and Disarmament Programme, 
World Future Council
3SUMMARY
CLImATE	 CHANgE	 AND	 NUCLEAR	 WEApONs	
REpREsENT	TWO	kEy	THREATs	OF	OUR	TImE.	
Climate change endangers ecosystems and social 
systems all over the world. The degradation of natu-
ral resources, the decline of water and food supplies, 
forced migration, and more frequent and intense dis-
asters will greatly affect population clusters, big and 
small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the 
world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat multi-
plier” in already fragile regions. This could contrib-
ute to a decline of international stability and trigger 
hostility between people and nations. Meanwhile, the 
15,500 nuclear weapons that remain in the arsenals 
of only a few states possess the destructive force to 
destroy life on Earth as we know multiple times over. 
With nuclear deterrence strategies still in place, and 
hundreds of weapons on ‘hair trigger alert’, the risks 
of nuclear war caused by accident, miscalculation or 
intent remain plentiful and imminent. 
Despite growing recognition that climate change and 
nuclear weapons pose critical security risks, THE	
LINkAgEs	 BETWEEN	 BOTH	 THREATs	 ARE	
LARgELy	IgNORED. However, nuclear and climate 
risks interfere with each other in a mutually enforc-
ing way. 
CONFLICTs	 INDUCED	 By	 CLImATE	 CHANgE	
COULD	CONTRIBUTE	TO	gLOBAL	INsECURITy,	
which, in turn, could enhance the chance of a nuclear 
weapon being used, could create more fertile breed-
ing grounds for terrorism, including nuclear terror-
ism, and could feed the ambitions among some states 
to acquire nuclear arms. Furthermore, as evidenced 
by a series of incidents in recent years, extreme 
weather events, environmental degradation and ma-
jor seismic events can directly impact the safety and 
security of nuclear installations. Moreover, a nuclear 
war could lead to a rapid and prolonged drop in aver-
age global temperatures and significantly disrupt the 
global climate for years to come, which would have 
disastrous implications for agriculture, threatening 
the food supply for most of the world. Finally, climate 
change, nuclear weapons and nuclear energy pose 
threats of intergenerational harm, as evidenced by 
the transgenerational effects of nuclear testing and 
nuclear power accidents and the lasting impacts on 
the climate, environment and public health by carbon 
emissions. 
4NUCLEAR	 ENERgy	 Is	 A	 CRITICAL	 IssUE	 IN	
BOTH	CLImATE	CHANgE	AND	NUCLEAR	WEAp-
ONs	 DEBATEs. Although sometimes offered as a 
solution to climate change, nuclear energy is neither 
required for nor capable of solving the climate crisis. 
Nuclear energy lacks the capacity potential to signif-
icantly replace the huge amounts of fossil energy, is 
not economically viable, and is not flexible to meet 
demand fluctuations by consumers. Furthermore, it 
stands in the way of increased renewable energy and 
enhanced energy efficiency. In addition, the nuclear 
‘fuel chain’ contains a variety of problems and risks, 
including the release of radioactive materials at every 
stage of the cycle and long-term safety problems of 
nuclear waste disposal. Another serious problem is 
the possibility at various stages of the nuclear fuel 
chain to divert nuclear technologies and know-how 
toward nuclear weapons development. The recogni-
tion of the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) further 
compounds this problem as it encourages states to 
develop nuclear industries, which can lead to high 
stakes confrontations and may trigger armed conflict. 
The discrepancy between long-term goals and con-
crete steps UNDERmINEs	THE	CONDITIONs	FOR	
INTERNATIONAL	COOpERATION	IN	sECURITy	
AND	 CLImATE	 pOLICy. Despite growing aware-
ness of the urgency of tackling the climate and nucle-
ar threat among policy-makers, academics and civil 
society, concrete action is lagging behind. Further-
more, there exist international legal obligations both 
with regard to curbing climate change and achieving 
universal nuclear disarmament. On both fronts, liti-
gation has been used to ensure these obligations are 
implemented.
sCIENTIsTs	AND	ENgINEERs invented the tech-
nologies to exploit fossil energy and nuclear power 
(both for civilian and military purposes) and so they 
HAvE	 A	 spECIAL	 REspONsIBILITy	 IN	 ABOL-
IsHINg	BOTH. Because of their expertise, they can 
make major contributions to abolishing nuclear arse-
nals and developing the technologies necessary for a 
sustainable energy transition. 
Preventing the dangers of climate change and nucle-
ar war requires an INTEgRATED	sET	OF	sTRATE-
gIEs that address the causes as well as the impacts 
on the natural and social environment. Institutions 
are needed to strengthen common, ecological and hu-
man security, build and reinforce conflict-resolution 
mechanisms, low-carbon energy alternatives and 
sustainable lifecycles that respect the capabilities of 
the living world and create the conditions for viable 
and sustainable peace. 
 
Climate change and 
nuclear weapons 
represent two key 
threats of our time. 
The linkages between 
both threats are largely 
ignored.
5In January 2015, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 
moved their symbolic ‘Doomsday Clock’ to three min-
utes to midnight, because of the gathering dangers 
of climate change and nuclear weapons, signalling 
the gravest threat to humanity since the throes of 
the Cold War. In his 2007 book The Seventh Decade: 
The New Shape of Nuclear Danger, Jonathan Schell 
writes on the linkages between nuclear weapons and 
global warming: “The two perils have a great deal in 
common. Both are the fruit of swollen human power—
in the one case, the destructive power of war; in the 
other, the productive power of fossil-fuel energy. Both 
put stakes on the table of a magnitude never present 
before in human decision making. Both threaten life 
on a planetary scale. Both require a fully global re-
sponse. Anyone concerned by the one should be con-
cerned with the other. It would be a shame to save the 
Earth from slowly warming only to burn it up in an 
instant in a nuclear war.”1  
This powerful statement points to the important but 
largely neglected linkages between two key dangers 
of our time. The nuclear menace has survived the 
Cold War and will continue to threaten life as long 
as its destructive potential persists. Similarly, glob-
al warming is increasingly posing severe dangers for 
natural and social systems in many regions of the 
world, as it could exceed their adaptive capacities 
and undermine international stability. This article 
examines the linkages between nuclear and climate 
risks and considers an approach to move from living 
under these security threats to building sustainable 
peace.
Figure 1: Existential threats of our time: nuclear explosions and carbon emissions 
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1.1.   NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE ARE EXISTENTIAL
THREATS TO HUMANITY
While the nuclear arsenals have been reduced, more 
than 15,500 nuclear weapons still remain (see figure 
2), enough to destroy life on earth as we know it multi-
ple times over.2 Recent studies indicate that the use of 
50-100 nuclear weapons on military targets and popu-
lated areas might be sufficient to trigger catastrophic 
climate change.3 This is about half the nuclear weap-
ons in the Indian and Pakistani arsenals and less than 
10% of the nuclear weapons that the United States 
and Russia maintain on high operational readiness 
to use (high-alert) under launch-on-warning policies. 
Although the stocks of nuclear weapons in the United 
States and Russia have diminished, nuclear weapons 
exist—and are often being extended and modernized—
in an additional seven countries (United Kingdom, 
France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea). 
In a few countries, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Turkey, foreign nuclear weapons 
are still being deployed (see figure 3). In addition, over 
the years several states have been suspected of build-
ing nuclear weapons, which has become an issue of 
conflict as highlighted by the cases of Iraq and Iran. 
Besides nuclear weapons, a number of countries are 
acquiring ballistic missiles, while others enter the 
arena of missile defence and space warfare. These 
1.  THE SECURITY 
CHALLENGES OF NUCLEAR 
WEAPONS AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE
Figure 2: Global nuclear arsenals 
(Source: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists)
Nuclear-armed states
States hosting nuclear weapons
States under extended nuclear deterrence agreements
Figure 3:  Nuclear-armed states, nuclear-hosting states and states under extended deterrence arrangements
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developments show that the nuclear spiral is still 
alive and fed by powerful forces of economic growth, 
political power and a culture of war.
The continued existence of nuclear weapons bears 
incalculable risks and undermines efforts to prevent 
further states and non-state actors from acquiring 
the bomb. With nuclear deterrence strategies still in 
place, the risks of nuclear war caused by accident, 
miscalculation or intent remain significant. More 
than a thousand tons of nuclear weapon-usable ma-
terials remain as well, and with the projected increase 
of nuclear energy the precursors for nuclear weapons 
development are thus proliferating. The possibility 
that nuclear weapons or sensitive nuclear materials 
could fall into the hands of terrorists cannot be ruled 
out. Indeed, intelligence assessments deem such a 
scenario worryingly plausible, due mostly to weak 
borders and ill-secured nuclear facilities and depots.4
By continuing the possession of nuclear weapons 
and attributing a crucial role to them in their security 
policies, the nuclear weapon states set a bad exam-
ple that continues to drive the pursuit of know-how 
and technology for nuclear weapons by other states. 
Military responses, including missile defence, coun-
ter-proliferation and nuclear weapons, fuel the arms 
race and undermine the political stability necessary 
for the controlled maintenance of nuclear weapons, 
which, in any case, cannot be guaranteed in the long 
run. As a flurry of reports in recent years has re-
vealed, nuclear policies and postures are highly ac-
cident-prone and have brought the world very close 
to an accidental nuclear detonation on several occa-
sions.5 Without a systematic and controlled elimina-
tion of the nuclear threat, an intentional or accidental 
use of nuclear weapons is a matter of time. To move 
away from the nuclear abyss, the world needs to abol-
ish all nuclear weapons as well as the main incen-













Figure 5: The nuclear and climate threat in popular 
culture: movie posters for the The Day After (1983) 
and The Day After Tomorrow (2003) 
(Source: Left – ABC; Right – 20th Century Fox)
Figure 4: Projections for global average surface temperature change 
(Source: Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)
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Not less dramatic are the risks of global warming, 
caused by the emissions of carbon dioxide and oth-
er greenhouse gases. The Fifth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has 
drawn a dire picture (see figure 4).7 
Climate change endangers ecosystems and social 
systems all over the world. The degradation of natu-
ral resources, the decline of water and food supplies, 
forced migration, and more frequent and intense dis-
asters will greatly affect population clusters, big and 
small. Climate-related shocks will add stress to the 
world’s existing conflicts and act as a “threat multi-
plier” in already fragile regions. This could contribute 
to a decline of international stability and trigger hos-
tility between people and nations.
91.2.  DESPITE MANY SIMILARITIES,
THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUCLEAR 
AND CLIMATE RISKS
TImEFRAmE | A nuclear war would result from 
short-term decisions of a small group of political and 
military leaders. It may be fought in a time span from 
hours to days and decisions are made within hours, 
even minutes. The consequences are felt within the 
same time span, e.g. a nuclear explosion can eradi-
cate a whole city within seconds, but there are also 
long-term consequences spanning multiple genera-
tions, primarily due to radioactive fallout. For com-
parison, climate change occurs over long timescales 
and gradually undermines the living conditions of 
humanity and other life over an extended period. De-
cisions on climate change have an impact decades 
and centuries later and can hardly be attributed to 
anyone in particular. Nevertheless, extreme weath-
er events such as hurricanes and tornados or floods 
and landslides may occur on rather short notice and 
affect millions of people who are unable to get out 
of harm’s way in time. With the possibility of abrupt 
climate change, a sequence of cascading events and 
tipping points could make humanity feel the drastic 
changes within decades.8
spATIAL	sCALE	AND	INTENsITy | Nuclear prolif-
eration and arms races are a global problem like cli-
mate change, even though the sources and impacts 
of either problem are driven by security issues and 
power structures on a local and regional scale. Global 
warming is caused by local emissions that accumu-
late in the atmosphere to induce global change, which 
in turn affects ecological and social systems locally. 
While an all-out nuclear war can lead to global hu-
man extinction, this is more unlikely for global warm-
ing because the consequences can be moderated by 
adaptive capacities that reduce the vulnerability of 
affected systems. Despite large uncertainties about 
the magnitude, frequency and distribution of risks, 
climate change is now widely recognised, including 
the human causes and impacts. The likelihood of 
nuclear war increases with nuclear proliferation and 
hawkish doctrines, but can hardly be quantified.
WHO	 Is	 REspONsIBLE? The sources of climate 
change are human activities, which cause nature 
to “respond” in accordance with natural laws. While 
human lifestyles contribute to carbon emission, in-
dustrial activities by countries are responsible for 
the lion’s share. The five initial nuclear weapon states 
are leading in military expenditure and are among 
the world’s largest carbon emitters. Different from 
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is 
a discriminatory regime that puts more restraints on 
the non-nuclear weapon states than on those with 
nuclear weapons, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) recognises 
a universal obligation to prevent dangerous climate 
change, and assigns the greatest responsibility to the 
polluters.
WHO	 Is	AFFECTED? During the Cold War nuclear 
weapons were largely directed against ideological 
antagonists who possessed the same type of weap-
ons. The end of the Cold War and the spread of nu-
clear weapons caused the bilateral nuclear threat 
between the Western and Eastern blocs to fragment, 
altered the geopolitical landscape in several regions 
and increased the stakes in related conflicts. The de-
velopment (including uranium mining) and testing 
of nuclear weapons have affected mostly indigenous 
peoples and poor communities directly impacted by 
the radiation emitted from these activities. As the 
effects of nuclear explosions cannot be contained 
in time or space, nuclear conflagrations may threat-
en the whole of humankind. By comparison, global 
warming is not a determined threat against com-
petitors but affects many communities on the plan-
et. The causes and consequences of climate change 
are distributed quite asymmetrically across different 
regions, raising questions of equity and injustice as 
well as difficulties of attributing responsibility for the 
consequences. While the powerful countries contrib-
ute the most to the risks, more affected are the weak 
and the vulnerable, in particular impoverished people 
in the global south. Ultimately, by undermining hu-
man security, large-scale climate change will likely 
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also affect the security of powerful nations, making 
their protection an increasingly costly endeavour.
WHO	Is	THE	ENEmy? In traditional security think-
ing there are determined enemies that seek to ac-
quire weapons of mass destruction, notably nuclear 
weapons, to challenge the powerful nations. While 
nuclear explosions can be attributed to an intentional 
act by a determined adversary (provided they are not 
accidental), motivations and perceptions are differ-
ent for climate change, which is involuntary and not 
caused by a particular enemy. Global warming results 
from all human beings’ greenhouse gas emissions, 
and at the same time affects humans across the globe 
by its impact. For those who are suffering the most 
from climate change, those who contribute more to 
the problem can be seen as more significant “threats”. 
Using this kind of security thinking is, however, ques-
tionable and distracts attention from the causes and 
possible solutions to the climate problem, which is 
more an environmental than a security issue.9
1.3.  NUCLEAR AND CLIMATE 
RISKS ARE KEY ISSUES IN CURRENT
SECURITY DEBATES
During the East-West conflict, nuclear war was seen 
as humanity’s gravest threat, and it may still be in 
terms of potential destructiveness. After the terror 
attacks of 11 September 2001, international attention 
shifted towards terrorism, and the George W. Bush Ad-
ministration used the terror attacks as an argument to 
make nuclear disarmament, as well as climate policy, 
a low priority. This short-sighted view neglected the 
fact that the continued existence of nuclear weapons 
perpetuated the possibility of nuclear terror attacks. 
Furthermore, international destabilisation resulting 
from climate change could provoke conflicts in frag-
ile regions of the world, which, in turn, could create 
more fertile breeding grounds of terrorism.
After a lost decade for disarmament, parts of the US 
establishment began to recognise that the continued 
existence of nuclear weapons could no longer be ben-
eficial and that nuclear proliferation to other coun-
tries and non-state actors would undermine their own 
security interests. This view has been expressed by 
the group of US elder statesmen, George Shultz, Hen-
ry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn, in their 
2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed. They predict that, 
without a major change in policy, the US will soon en-
ter a “new nuclear era that will be more precarious, 
psychologically disorienting, and economically even 
more costly than was Cold War deterrence.”10 Similar-
ly, the former British Foreign Minister Margaret Beck-
ett at the end of her term warned of nuclear risks and 
made clear that, as with the abolition of slavery, the 
ultimate goal would not be regulation or reductions, 
but the elimination of nuclear weapons.11 These calls 
for a nuclear weapon-free world have been repeated 
by officials and former statesmen from many other 
countries, including nuclear weapon states.12
Despite these calls, hundreds of missiles carrying 
an estimated 1,800 nuclear warheads in US and Rus-
sian arsenals remain on ‘hair-trigger alert status’, a 
doctrinal legacy from the Cold War that would send 
them flying at a moment’s notice. In the wake of the 
conflict in Ukraine, nuclear weapons have enjoyed 
increased prominence in Russian and NATO defence 
doctrines. Russia’s nuclear strategy appears to point 
to a lowering of the threshold for using nuclear weap-
ons in any conflict, while NATO (especially its central 
and eastern European members) will be reluctant to 
lower or phase-out the role of nuclear weapons in the 
alliance. 
Following hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the IPCC re-
ports in 2007 and 2014, attention increasingly shifted 
to the security risks of global warming.13 There was 
growing concern about large-scale cascading events 
in the climate system that could lead to internation-
al instability and become as devastating as a nuclear 
disaster. Among the potential tipping elements in the 
climate system are the loss of the South Asian mon-
soon and the Amazon rainforest, the breakdown of 
the North Atlantic thermohaline circulation, polar ice 
melting and global sea-level rise.14 Tipping points and 
cascading events can also occur in social systems 
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where climate change may become a risk multipli-
er in the world’s complex crises.15 Major examples 
include hot spots of climate change and human in-
security; vulnerable infrastructures and networks; 
economic and financial crises; social and political 
instability; environmental migration; climate change 
and violent conflict (see figure 6).
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warned that cli-
mate change might pose as much of a danger to the 
world as war. In April 2007, the UN Security Council 
held its first debate on climate change indicating that 
global warming has elevated to the top of the inter-
national security agenda, rivalling the threat of war. 
Initiated by the United Kingdom, former Foreign Sec-
retary Margaret Beckett compared emerging climate 
change to the “gathering storm” before World War II: 
“An unstable climate risks some of the drivers of con-
flict – such as migratory pressures and competition 
for resources – getting worse.”16 
In Spring 2008, the European Commission issued a 
report stating that climate change “is already having 
profound consequences for international security” 
which are not just of a “humanitarian nature” but in-
clude political and security risks that directly affect 
European interests.17 It held that, “The core challenge 
is that climate change threatens to overburden states 
and regions which are already fragile and conflict 
prone.”18 This analysis has been supported by the de-
fence and security establishments in many countries, 
including the US Department of Defense, which in a 
2015 report stated that “global climate change will 
have wide-ranging implications for U.S. national se-
curity interests over the foreseeable future because it 
will aggravate existing problems — such as poverty, 
social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffec-
tual leadership, and weak political institutions — that 
threaten domestic stability in a number of coun-
tries.”19  
Droughts and general water scarcity
Recurrent flooding
Loss of ecosystems and ecosystem services
Extreme events (forest fires, heat waves, storms)
Loss of coastal areas due to sea level rise
Migration flows
Desertification
Melting of glaciers and ice shields
Ongoing conflicts affected by droughts and general water scarcity
Ongoing conflicts affected by recurrent flooding
Reduced food production due to
higher temperatures and drought
LOW   HIGH
Societal risks and responses
Risk  HIGH   LOW
Adaptive
Capacity
Figure 6: Climate change and instability hotspots 
(Source: Climate and Conflict, Scheffran/Battaglini 2011)
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Besides these political statements, the impacts of 
climate change on security have become subject to 
research, investigating the impacts of climate-relat-
ed events on social and political stability on different 
parts of the world. Particularly unstable are fragile 
and weak states with social fragmentation, poor gov-
ernance and management capacity. By altering the 
natural and social environment, climate change is 
a potential driver for violent conflict, including civil 
wars and military interventions that in turn are as-
sociated with various negative consequences such as 
famine and economic crises, forced displacement, re-
source exploitation and environmental degradation. 
There is a wide range of possible conflict constella-
tions associated with the effects of climate change on 
rainfall and water scarcity, land use and food security, 
migration and refugee movements, extreme weather 
events and natural disasters, vegetation and biodiver-
sity, which can become conflict factors individually 
or in conjunction.20 They may trigger societal tipping 
points, leading to social unrest, riots, violence, crime 
and armed conflict.
A spectacular example is the social and political un-
rest in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since 
2011, a region that has been preoccupied with fossil 
fuel dependence, wars on oil and nuclear proliferation 
for a long time. In the wake of the Arab spring, which 
affected the entire region and provoked a change of 
regimes in several countries, Syria and Libya expe-
rienced bloody civil wars. With a rise in temperature 
and decreased precipitation water supply and agri-
culture are hit, affecting the lives of people.21 Possi-
ble connecting mechanisms between climate and 
conflict are international food markets and prices 
which are affected by hazard-induced harvest losses. 
Another factor were the devastating droughts that hit 
the main growing areas of Syria before the rebellion 
and drove many people from the countryside to the 
cities, in 2010 alone 50,000 Syrian families.22 While in 
2002 more than 30% of Syrians were working in agri-
culture, this share fell to less than 15% in 2010.23 Syr-
ia already suffered from the presence of more than 1 
million Iraqi refugees who had fled after the US inva-
sion in 2003, a war that was justified by Iraq’s nuclear 
programme, destabilised the region and opened the 
door to the Islamic State. This demonstrates that Syr-
ia is an example of a war with many root causes that 
multiply in highly complex ways.24
Finally, as several natural disasters in recent years 
have demonstrated, extreme weather events, envi-
ronmental degradation and major seismic events can 
also directly cause dangers for nuclear safety and 
security. The wildfires that spread through Russia 
in the summer of 2010 posed a severe nuclear risk to 
the country when they were on their way to engulf 
key nuclear sites. In addition, there was widespread 
concern that radionuclides from land contaminated 
by the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster could rise to-
gether with combustion particles, resulting in a new 
pollution zone. Luckily, the authorities managed to 
contain the fires in time.25 
There has also been increased concern about the 
location of nuclear facilities in flood-risk areas. Sea 
level rise, storm surges and bursting dams all pose an 
increasing danger to nuclear power stations across 
the world. According to a 2011 report by the US Nu-
clear Regulatory Authority more than 30 nuclear in-
stallations across the country were in danger from 
Figure 7: Damage to Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power	plant’s	unit	4	reactor	by	explosions	and	fires	
caused by the earthquake and tsunami 
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flooding.26 Similar flooding concerns exist in other 
countries.27 Apart from concerns about the impact 
of flooding on the integrity of reactors, which could 
result in a meltdown, flooding and other environmen-
tal degradation can also affect the general security of 
nuclear installations, civilian or military. This could 
be particularly dangerous in areas with non-state ac-
tors attempting to acquire a nuclear weapon or fissile 
material to fashion a ‘dirty bomb’. 
The major damage caused to the Fukushima Daiichi 
nuclear power plant in Japan in March 2011 after a 
9.0-magnitude earthquake and subsequent tsuna-
mi hit the coast line has also drawn attention to the 
possible dangers of seismic activity for nuclear infra-
structure (see figure 7). Worryingly, the Fukushima 
nuclear power plant is not the only facility located in 
a natural disaster-prone area. Research conducted by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency reveals that 
20 percent of the world’s 442 working nuclear power 
stations are in areas of “significant” seismic activity. 
These events confirm what many intuitively already 
feel: in this seismically active world, characterized by 
an increasingly unpredictable environment, nuclear 
facilities, weapons and materials represent a highly 
volatile variable in an already unstable equation.28
 1 .4.  NUCLEAR WAR CAN LEAD 
TO A DRAMATIC AND IMMEDIATE 
COOLING OF THE ATMOSPHERE
Although US-Russian nuclear arsenals have been 
significantly reduced (by more than two-thirds since 
1989) the total number of nuclear weapons in the 
world—93% of which belong to the US and Russia—is 
still sufficient to threaten the extinction of advanced 
life on earth. Recent scientific studies suggest that 
even a ‘limited’ regional nuclear exchange would 
eject so much debris into the atmosphere that it could 
rapidly cool down the planet to temperatures not felt 
since the ice ages (“nuclear winter”) and significant-
ly disrupt the global climate for years to come.29 Re-
searchers modelled the effects of a nuclear war be-
tween India and Pakistan, in which each would use 50 
Hiroshima-sized nuclear weapons (about 15 kilotons 
each) on major populated centres, and estimated that 
burning cities could release as much as five million 
tons of soot (impure carbon particles) into the atmos-
phere, where the absorption of sunlight would further 
heat the smoke and lift it into the stratosphere. Here 
the smoke could persist for years and block much 
of the sun’s light from reaching the earth’s surface, 
Figure 8: Global average surface temperature changes estimated in cases of small, moderate and large  
nuclear wars in the context of the change of climate since 1880 (Source: nucleardarkness.org)
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causing surface temperatures to drop drastically (see 
figure 8). This would have disastrous implications for 
agriculture and threaten the food supply for most of 
the planet (see figure 9). It has been estimated that 
between one and two billion people could die of star-
vation as a result (“nuclear famine”).30
1.5 NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NUCLEAR
ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: 
THREE INTER-GENERATIONAL THREATS
Nuclear weapons and climate change pose existen-
tial threats to humanity, as indicated above. Nuclear 
weapons and climate change, along with nuclear en-
ergy, also pose serious concerns of inter-generational 
harm.
The testing by detonation of over 2,000 nuclear weap-
ons has generated radioactive contamination of 
lands rendering some uninhabitable for generations. 
The radiation released has also impacted on genetic 
codes in humans, which will affect reproduction for 
generations. Already, we are witnessing second and 
third generation birth deformities and congenital 
disease as a result of the atmospheric tests from the 
1950s and 1960s.
The impact of carbon emissions and other climate 
change gases is also inter-generational. Carbon 
dioxide has unique long-term effects on climate 
change that are largely “irreversible” for hundreds of 
years. Even when emissions stop, the destructive im-
pact would continue.
Nuclear energy also poses inter-generational risks 
from any leaks and accidents, and imposes intergen-
erational responsibility to manage the waste, which 
is dangerous for thousands of years. Nuclear acci-
dents usually have impacts far beyond the direct sur-
rounding environment and far beyond the generation 
in which it occurs. The nuclear accidents at Three-
Mile Island, Windscale, Mayak, Chernobyl and Fuku-
shima have shown that nuclear technology breaking 
down can cause social and environmental damage, as 
well as inter-generational violations of human rights, 
including rights to life, health, land, houses and safe 
water. The detailed analysis on the Fukushima acci-
dent and it implications in 2011 in Japan sheds a sad 
light on the dangers of this technology. Compensa-
tion alone cost the operating utility of TEPCO more 
than $US 40 billion and only lucky circumstances 
prevented a much larger disaster impacting also on a 
number of other Japanese reactors.31
The nuclear industry has also been unable to find or 
develop a safe and secure disposal system for this 
waste, passing this problem onto future generations 
along with the waste itself. C.G. Weeramantry, for-
mer Vice-President of the International Court of Jus-
tice, says that this is “the gravest of possible crimes 
against future generations.”32
He writes: “If people of the Stone Age had been able 
to cause damage to the environment and cause con-
genital deformities to our generation, we would have 
condemned them as savages, brutes and barbarians. 
Yet, even if they could have caused such damage, 
they could have had no idea of the irreparable harm 
they were causing to generations yet unborn. We, on 
the other hand, who are fully aware of the catastroph-
ic damage we are causing to unborn generations, still 
proceed regardless pursuing activities which, it is 
patently clear, will release these dangers sooner or 
later. We continue to build nuclear reactors all over 
the world.”33
Figure 9: Projected Canadian wheat production loss 
estimated after the global drops in average surface 










2. NUCLEAR ENERGY: 
NO SOLUTION TO FOSSIL 
ENERGY DEPENDENCE  
AND GLOBAL WARMING
2.1.  NUCLEAR POWER IS NEITHER
REQUIRED FOR NOR CAPABLE 
OF SOLVING THE CLIMATE CRISIS 
Nuclear power is often presented as a solution to the 
problem of climate change because it would replace 
fossil energy use as a source of CO2 emissions. Giv-
en the safety and security risks of nuclear power and 
its limited ability and economic viability in address-
ing global warming, this is not a viable alternative.34 
Nuclear energy cannot significantly replace the huge 
amounts of fossil energy and causes additional risks. 
Rather, it is is too costly and stands in the way of in-
creased renewable energy, enhanced energy efficien-
cy and smart grids. 
While nuclear power’s share in electricity generation 
has been declining both absolutely and relatively in 
recent years—in 2014 it constituted only 6% of glob-
al installed capacity (see figure 10)—a revival of nu-
clear investments is not unlikely. At the same time, 
renewable energy technologies broke another record 
last year, accounting for over 60% of net addition to 
the world’s power capacity, providing more than 
19% of the global energy consumption.35 Since 2000, 
renewable energy capacity has grown 120% and the 
cost-competitiveness of renewable power generation 
technologies has reached historic levels.36 Biomass 
for power, hydropower, geothermal and onshore wind 
can all now provide electricity competitively com-
pared to fossil fuel-fired power generation and the 
levelised cost of electricity of solar photovoltaics (PV) 
Figure 10: Global installed capacity in 2014  
and projected capacity in 2040 
(Source: New Energy Outlook 2015,  
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Global projected capacity in 2040
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has halved between 2010 and 2014, so that solar PV 
is also increasingly competitive at the utility scale.37 
Compared to nuclear, renewable energy technologies 
are competitive and market-ready, they rely upon in-
definitely available resources that are naturally oc-
curring, constant and free to access as well as spur 
socio-economic development. The massive “nuclear 
renaissance” required for a significant impact would 
be unlikely to take place for economic and security 
reasons.
FLEXIBILITY AND ENERGY SECURITY CHALLENGES
Compared to other power sources, nuclear has the 
lowest flexibility to react to demand fluctuations by 
consumers. Nuclear power technology does not allow 
for a rapid electricity generation response, such as 
ramping up or ramping down capacity output with-
in a few hours, let alone minutes or seconds what a 
modern power system based on variable renewables 
such as solar and wind might require. In fact, com-
pared to all other power technologies, nuclear has the 
worst response speed and less than half or all nucle-
ar capacity might be able to react within six hours.38 
So, nuclear is either ‘on’ or ‘off’. As we deal with large 
capacities of individual nuclear plants, either mode 
has huge implications on grid stability. To maintain 
or expand large-scale inflexible nuclear power could 
reduce incentives for demand side efficiency of elec-
tric appliances. The inability of nuclear power plants 
to deliver flexible and demand driven dispatch loads 
means that they only work in an electricity grid that 
is heavily based on large base-load power stations 
(primarily coal, nuclear and gas). It also means that 
states that invest in or rely on higher shares of nu-
clear energy will likely hamper a transition to decen-
tralised renewable energy systems since they would 
need to maintain an electricity system suited to in-
flexible base-load nuclear power. 
Compared to low-risk renewable energy coupled with 
high energy efficiency and an innovative electric grid 
and load management in the power sector, nuclear 
energy is in fact a strong obstacle to energy securi-
ty and to a smart and affordable consumer-driven 
electricity demand system with strong roots in de-
centralised and distributed energy architecture. In 
addition, nuclear has no role to play for providing ba-
sic power services for the about 1.3 billion poor people 
mainly in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa who do 
not have access to reliable and clean electricity. In 
particular access to electricity in non-grid connected 
areas is most cost-effectively delivered by decentral-
ised renewable energy sources.39
CAPACITY SHORTFALLS
Because of the long planning cycles and its inade-
quacy for use in combustion and as transportation 
fuel, nuclear energy cannot replace in a reasonable 
timeframe the large amounts of fossil fuel currently 
consumed. Since the uranium resources are limited, 
a sustainable energy supply based on nuclear ener-
gy cannot be realised with a once-through cycle that 
avoids plutonium reprocessing. Even a drastic in-
crease in nuclear energy could not compensate for the 
current growth in energy consumption, would come 
too late for preventing climate change and would lead 
to an enormous increase in plutonium stocks, with all 
its aforementioned problems.
Due to the expected shutdowns of aging power plants, 
it will already be challenging to replace these power 
plants, not to mention multiplying their capacity. In 
its low-use reference scenario for the nuclear pow-
er outlook, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
predicted that the installed capacity of nuclear power 
will remain nearly constant by the year 2030. In its 
high-use scenario, almost a doubling of nuclear pow-
er capacity is projected. In either case, the share of 
nuclear power in total energy generation and the CO2 
reduction will remain only a few percent. This net 
effect would easily be negated by the energy growth 
in the South. What is actually required is a phase-out 
of CO2 emissions by 2050.40 Even without a massive 
expansion of nuclear energy, the conventional urani-
um resources will be consumed within the next five 
decades (not considering uranium in the oceans). 
Switching to plutonium processing and fast breed-
er reactors could stretch the existing resources, but 
would be far more risky, more expensive and less 
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proliferation-resistant, thus adding to the existing 
risks of nuclear power. 
ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
Given the high economic cost of nuclear power, cheap 
nuclear electricity has remained a fiction. While 
most renewable power utility costs (weighted aver-
ages) fluctuate between $US 1,000 – 4,000 per kW in-
stalled,41 recent nuclear assessments show the utter 
increase of up to $US 8,000 per kW such as in UK (Hin-
kley Point).42 Although nuclear power has been heav-
ily subsidized by governments and external costs are 
still not internalised into its market price, nuclear 
energy is not commercially competitive compared to 
advanced renewable energies that receive similar fi-
nancial support.  In a comprehensive environmental 
and economic assessment, including external costs 
from waste disposal, uranium mining, fuel processing 
and radioactive emissions during normal operations, 
most renewable energy sources look better than nu-
clear energy. This partially explains the apparent 
slowdown of or withdrawal from nuclear power in in-
dustrialised countries and their diminished interest 
in a further build-up. The investment risk has further 
increased due to nuclear accidents, protests against 
nuclear energy and the higher requirements of gov-
ernmental licensing procedures (especially in the US 
and Germany).
NO ‘CARBON-FREE’ ENERGY SOURCE
Nuclear power is not carbon-free if the whole life-cy-
cle of electricity production is taken into considera-
tion. The World Nuclear Association has compared 
a wide range of studies, finding a mean of 29 tonnes 
CO2/GWh for nuclear power (with some studies find-
ing 130 CO2/GWh), which is comparable to hydropow-
er, lower than photovoltaic and higher than for wind 
or improved efficiency of electricity generation and 
use.43  
VULNERABLE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change will further exacerbate the risks of 
nuclear energy. We have seen already the need to 
power down some nuclear plants due to increased 
river water temperatures in summer that cannot de-
liver sufficient cooling. Nuclear energy might require, 
depending on cooling technologies, between 10,000 
and 400,000 litres of freshwater per MWh while wind 
and solar PV need less than 100 litres.44 While this is 
only one example, demand on natural resources such 
as water for production of nuclear energy are large 
and are not sustainable in a world that already fac-
es increasing scarcity of these natural resources and 
where climate change poses additional threats.
A TARGET FOR ATTACKS
Over the past decades, at least two nuclear power 
plants (Armenian NPP and Zaporizhia NPP) were 
close to combat zones and at risk of being impact-
ed. Nuclear power plants can always be damaged by 
modern weapons (such as a multiple launcher rock-
et systems widely used in local armed conflicts) or 
through non-conventional acts of terror (e.g. the use 
of civilian aircraft). There is no plan or design that 
could prevent it. Moreover, widespread placement of 
NPPs with their spent fuel pools, storages of spent 
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste on the banks of 
ponds endangers source of drinking water for mil-
lions of people, even if armed attack will not destroy 
the reactor itself.
2.2.  PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE 
NUCLEAR ‘FUEL CYCLE’
While fossil energy sources release carbon into the 
atmosphere, which is driving global warming, the 
nuclear ‘fuel cycle’ (which is more a chain or a spiral 
than a closed cycle) contains a variety of problems 
and risks.45  
RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Radioactive materials are released and accumulated 
at each stage of the nuclear chain, including uranium 
mining and fuel rod production, reactor operation and 
reprocessing, and transport and disposal (see figure 
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11). Even under normal operations, it is difficult to 
avoid radioactive materials from being released into 
the environment, not to speak of the dangers of re-
peated errors and accidents throughout the process. 
These radioactive emissions present a conflict po-
tential with international dimensions. An increasing 
number of countries acquiring nuclear power as part 
of a “nuclear renaissance” would multiply the nuclear 
safety, health and proliferation risks.
HEALTH IMPACTS
Further, several stages of the fuel chain can bring sig-
nificant negative health impacts such as increased 
cancer rates, polluted water and soils to the peoples 
on whose territories the uranium is mined and who 
had to and still have to work in the mines. The result-
ant mining waste, often including various grades of 
concentrations of remaining radionuclides, is often 
stored open-air posing risks for the radioactive con-
tamination of ground and surface water as well as 
agricultural produce. When accidents occur, it is par-
ticularly local and socially vulnerable groups of peo-
ple that suffer most. Since radioactive contamination 
causes various types of cancer, children are particu-
larly at risk.
DUAL-USE RISK
Nuclear power is also inextricably linked to nuclear 
weapons development.46 The linkage between civil-
ian and military nuclear technologies contains po-
tentially high security risks. So far, about one-third of 
the countries using nuclear power have built nuclear 
weapons, and only one (South Africa) has given them 
up, besides the successor states of the Soviet Union 
(Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan). According to a 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) study on 
“The Future of Nuclear Power”, a four-fold increase of 
the world’s nuclear capacity by 2050 could double the 
number of countries using this form of energy.47 At 
various stages of the nuclear fuel chain, transitions 
to nuclear weapons technology are possible, contrib-
uting to the danger of their worldwide proliferation. 
A serious problem is the ambivalence of science and 
the civil-military dual use of nuclear technologies 
and facilities involved in the production and process-
ing of weapons-grade materials. These include ura-
nium enrichment, fuel production and reprocessing 
of spent nuclear fuel. Around 20 countries already 
have access to such technologies. This trend would 
increase with a further global expansion of nuclear 
energy.
Figure 11: Nuclear fuel chain based on uranium 
























Despite the elimination of almost 500 tons of Russian 
and US highly enriched uranium (HEU), the global in-
ventory still totals around 1,345 tons, with almost 99 
percent held by the nuclear-armed states.48 The glob-
al stockpile of separated plutonium is about 500 tons, 
divided almost equally between civilian and military 
stocks (see figure 12). One hundred tons of plutoni-
um would be theoretically sufficient for up to 20,000 
nuclear warheads. A large fraction is still embedded 
into radioactive nuclear waste, which would have to 
be reprocessed in order to extract fissile materials. 
With increasing civilian use, the amount of plutoni-
um also tends to increase. As long as plutonium use 
is pursued on a global scale, an irreversible path to 
a nuclear weapon-free world is difficult to achieve. 
The obvious problems and dangers of nuclear weap-
ons proliferation and continued nuclear weapons de-
velopment would be aggravated with more countries 
establishing national nuclear programmes, as this 
would allow access to nuclear-weapons materials, ei-
ther intentionally or unintentionally.49 
A considerable international effort of inspections is 
pursued by the International Atomic Energy Agen-
cy (IAEA) to avoid that non-nuclear weapon states 
which are members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) divert material for nuclear weapons. An 
effective control that excludes the civil-military dual 
use in the nuclear sector does not exist. Even if there 
are currently no intentions to build a nuclear weapon, 
the nuclear option can be technologically prepared 
or maintained along the nuclear fuel chain. This pro-
vides critics and sceptics with reasons to speculate on 
actual or future intentions to start a nuclear weapons 
programme, which could easily lead to a high stakes 
confrontation. Undeclared programmes of nuclear 
weapons or ambivalent nuclear power programmes 
are often ‘crisis multipliers’ in regional conflicts. As 
has been illustrated by the decades-long political 
standoff over the Iranian nuclear programme, which 
led to a historic accord in July 2015 ending economic 
sanctions against Iran in exchange for restrictions on 
its nuclear programme, the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between civilian and military nuclear ambitions 
remains a source for discrimination, threat, mistrust 
and fear in international relations. 
Figure 12: National stocks of separated plutonium 
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2.3.  NUCLEAR WASTE DISPOSAL 
AND CLIMATE ENGINEERING ARE 
TECHNICAL ATTEMPTS TO BURY THE 
RISKS OR MANIPULATE THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR 
TECHNOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
The long-term risks of nuclear energy become obvi-
ous at the end of the nuclear fuel chain. Nuclear waste 
disposal (whether from nuclear power production, nu-
clear weapons programmes or nuclear disarmament) 
will remain a problem over thousands of years, and 
many future generations will have to bear this load 
without having the short-term “benefit” of the current 
generation. Since about the early 1970s, some 350,000 
tons of spent nuclear fuel had been generated world-
wide with an annual growth of about another 10,000 
tons today. This High Level radioactive Waste (HLW) 
is highly toxic and needs to be stored safely for sev-
eral thousand years. Yet, even after almost 50 years of 
operations globally, the IEA admits: “No country has 
yet established permanent facilities for the disposal 
of high-level radioactive waste from commercial re-
actors, which continues to build up in temporary stor-
age”.50 To decay half of the amount of plutonium 239, 
which is the primary fissile isotope used for the pro-
duction of nuclear weapons, it takes around 24,000 
years or 1,000 human generations, much longer than 
the known history of homo sapiens. After decades of 
nuclear energy production, the pile of nuclear waste 
is still growing, even though worldwide not a single 
site for final disposal of spent fuels is operating and 
temporary storage is continuously being extended. It 
is uncertain whether and when a responsible solu-
tion to the long-term disposal of radioactive waste 
can be found.51 
All the solution concepts on the table are burdened 
with problems: dropping the nuclear waste into the 
deep ocean, storing it in the ice of Antarctica, launch-
ing it into outer space, injecting liquid waste under 
groundwater bearing layers and different variants of 
underground storage have all been taken into consid-
eration.52 In the 1970s the concept of “safe” disposal in 
deep geological formations was explored. This would 
provide long-term isolation and containment without 
any future maintenance. While many governments 
and international organizations prefer this approach, 
others want to keep the waste in a retrievable and 
controlled form, combined with long-term surveil-
lance. In any case, it is highly uncertain whether the 
evidence for a final repository can ever be proven to 
sufficiently guarantee long-term safety and security.
Geoengineering is offered as a solution for reducing 
dangerous climate change by deliberately modifying 
the Earth System. Suggested measures of “climate 
engineering” (CE) include carbon capture and seques-
tration in biomass, soil, underground or in the ocean; 
aerosol emissions to absorb sunlight in higher layers 
of the atmosphere (similar to volcano eruptions); and 
other means of changing the Earth’s radiation bal-
ance by reflecting sunlight, e.g. through large mirrors 
in outer space (see figure 13: Geoengineering propos-
als).53 To varying degrees, these measures have un-
known efficiency, costs and risks. Moving from invol-
untarily changing the atmosphere through emissions 
to the intentional manipulation of the climate system 
and the regulation of global temperature (like in a 
“global air conditioning system”) opens a Pandora’s 
Box of competing actions between countries. 
The assessment of climate engineering should not 
focus only on the technical and economic dimen-
sions, but consider the political and social implica-
tions as well.54 Related policies should not become a 
playground for capital interests and power games or 
increase the barriers between North and South and 
between rich and poor. If these developments are not 
avoided, CE measures could turn into security risks or 
trigger conflicts for current and future generations.55 
What appears to be a remote possibility may turn into 
a real danger if the atmospheric manipulation by one 
state severely affects the interests of other states.
CE techniques should not create more risks than 
they avoid. As long as there are large uncertainties 
about the consequences of CE measures, they should 
not be pursued. It is important to differentiate be-
tween CE techniques with relative low risk (such as 
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afforestation and carbon storage in biomass) and 
those with a high potential risk (such as large scale 
manipulation of the atmosphere and the earth’s ra-
diation balance). Preference should be given to pre-
ventive mitigation measures, followed by practical 
adaptation against unavoidable climate consequenc-
es. CE should only be considered as a strategy of last 
resort if other measures have been used to the max-
imum possible degree. In comparing the options, the 
costs, benefits and risks of the alternatives need to be 
considered, as well as uncertainties, perceptions and 
complexities. Research can help to reduce the uncer-
tainty, make risks more assessable and provide a bet-
ter understanding of the alternatives. Currently there 
is no reason for hasty or premature decisions since 
climate change can still be contained in other ways 
and CE is not a full-fledged solution. Rather than ex-
panding carbon emissions and burying or correcting 
the consequences through geoengineering, it is more 
appropriate to avoid the problems in the first place by 
mitigation measures.56 To this end, it is essential to 
establish a nuclear-free, carbon-free and sustainable 
energy system.57 Because of the adverse linkages be-
tween nuclear and climate risks, it is time to develop 
a new thinking that synergizes solutions in both nu-
clear security and climate policy with an integrated 
framework of sustainable peace.
Figure 13: Geoengineering proposals 



















3. FROM CONFLICT TO 
COOPERATION: TOWARDS 
SUSTAINABLE PEACE
3.1.  THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN 
LONG-TERM GOALS AND CONCRETE 
STEPS UNDERMINES THE CONDITIONS 
FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
ON SECURITY AND CLIMATE POLICY
Whether nuclear risks and climate change will lead 
to more conflict or cooperation will depend on how 
human beings and their societies respond to these 
challenges. In the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), countries 
agreed to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interfer-
ence with the climate system. In the 2009 Copenha-
gen Accord, most nations supported the goal of lim-
iting global temperature change to 2 degrees Celsius 
by the end of the century, but failed to define concrete 
steps toward that goal. During his election campaign 
in 2008, candidate Barack Obama committed to an 80 
percent reduction of CO2 emissions by the middle of 
the century,58 but effective measures to achieve that 
goal have been repeatedly delayed. His presidency 
has been marked by staunch Republican resistance 
in the US Congress against climate regulation. Mean-
while, carbon emissions have continued to rise, with 
the global average concentration of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere hitting new records after crossing 
400 parts per million in March 2015—a “new danger 
zone” according to the Executive Secretary of the UN-
FCCC.59 The climate change agreement that the Unit-
ed States and China struck in November 2014, offers 
some hope for unilateral reductions of greenhouse 
gas emissions. Under the agreement, China agreed to 
slow and then peak its emissions by 2030 or sooner 
if possible, after which it would reduce emissions, 
Figure 14: Possible emission paths for the 2°C goal 
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while the United States agreed to reduce emissions 
by up to 17% by 2020 and 28% by 2025.60 The 2015 Con-
ference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in Paris provid-
ed a political breakthrough by reaching agreement on 
the goal of limiting global average warming to well 
below 2°C with the aim of limiting the temperature 
increase to 1.5°C. A further achievement of the Par-
is Agreement was the broad political acceptance of 
the scientific consensus that climate change is an 
urgent global challenge that requires unprecedented 
cooperation. The Agreement61 and the accompanying 
outcome document,62 which takes effect immediate-
ly, also established an elaborate process to review 
states’ performance in meeting nationally deter-
mined goals of contributing to global mitigation (pre-
vention) of and adaptation to climate change, and to 
encourage them to adopt more ambitious goals. How-
ever, the agreement suffers from several flaws that 
put into question its ability to curb dangerous climate 
change. Nationally declared emission caps, the key 
element of states’ contributions to mitigating climate 
change, are not legally binding which means that the 
2°C threshold—commonly accepted as necessary to 
prevent critical climatic tipping points—could still be 
breached. In addition, the climate finance pledged as 
$100 billion per year for developing countries by 2020, 
with a commitment to further finance in the future, is 
seen by some as late and insufficient. Finally, the text 
shows that governments still seek to manage emis-
sions instead of phasing them out. This is well re-
flected by the fact that parties could only agree upon 
the goal of “achieving a balance between anthropo-
genic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of 
greenhouse gases” rather than a pact for decarboni-
sation or a commitment to 100% Renewable Energy.
Obama also spoke in favour of a nuclear weapon-free 
world in Berlin in 200863 and in Prague in 2009,64 but 
so far concrete measures have lagged behind rhetoric. 
At his initiative, significant attention has been given 
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to preventing nuclear terrorism through a series of 
Nuclear Security Summits on the topic of bringing 
nuclear materials, technologies and facilities under 
safer and more secure control. Furthermore, the in-
ternational agreement to ensure that the Iranian nu-
clear programme remains for peaceful purposes has 
been widely heralded as a significant contribution 
to preventing nuclear proliferation. Although impor-
tant, these efforts only focus on proliferation risks, 
rather than address the risks of the estimated 15,500 
nuclear weapons still in the arsenals of the nine nu-
clear-armed states, many of which are on high-alert 
status, ready to be launched at a moment’s notice. It is 
imperative that the same high-level political support 
given to combating nuclear terrorism and preventing 
proliferation is given to eliminating nuclear weapons.
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New 
START) is a moderate and important step towards 
further reduction of the US and Russian nuclear ar-
senals. Its ratification in the US Senate in December 
2010 demonstrates that the strong resistance at the 
domestic front can be overcome, albeit at the cost of 
meeting the Republican Party’s demands for a costly 
modernization of the nuclear arsenals.65 
On the international level, the goal of nuclear aboli-
tion has found wide support, in particular in recent 
resolutions in the UN General Assembly;66 a vote by 
the UN Security Council in 2009;67 a 2013 High-Level 
Meeting of the UN General Assembly on Nuclear Dis-
armament;68 a United Nations Open-Ended Working 
Group (OEWG),69 set up by the UN General Assembly in 
November 2012 “to develop proposals to take forward 
multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for 
the achievement and maintenance of a world with-
out nuclear weapons”;70 governmental conferences 
on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons held 
in 2013 and 2014 in Oslo, Nayarit, and Vienna; and the 
introduction of the ‘Austrian Pledge’, which seeks to 
“fill the legal gap for the prohibition and elimination 
of nuclear weapons” and to date has gained support 
from 127 states.71 
Furthermore, over the course of the last half-centu-
ry, a great number of states have adopted policies 
prohibiting nuclear weapons, primarily through es-
tablishing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones. Five such 
zones exist today, with four of them spanning the en-
tire Southern Hemisphere (see figure 15). In addition, 
several countries, including New Zealand, Austria, 
The Philippines and Mongolia have adopted nation-
al legislation banning nuclear weapons. Other coun-
tries, including Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
South Africa have dismantled their nuclear weapons 
capabilities. 
Support among non-nuclear weapon states and civ-
il society groups for a legal instrument that would 
prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons has grown 
considerably in recent years. Options proposed in-
clude a Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) or pack-
age of agreements involving all states, a ban treaty 
involving those states that are ready now to prohibit 
nuclear weapons, a ban on use followed by negotia-
tions on elimination, a framework agreement (i.e. an 
agreement on what is required to eliminate nuclear 
weapons and on negotiations to achieve this), or a 
hybrid mix of some of these approaches.72 The final 
document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference73  not-
ed UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s five-point 
proposal for nuclear disarmament of 24 October 
2008, “which proposes, inter alia, consideration of 
negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or 
agreement on a framework of separate mutually re-
inforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of 
verification.”74 Many states and anti-nuclear civil so-
ciety groups see negotiation of a NWC as politically 
feasible and necessary to move beyond the current 
disarmament stalemate.75 So far, major progress has 
not been achieved due to resistance from the nuclear 
weapon states, which, instead, have engaged in ver-
tical proliferation programmes and shown little will-
ingness to downgrade the role of nuclear weapons in 
their security doctrines.76 The failure of the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference to agree on an outcome document 
is further evidence of the profound disagreements be-
tween nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear states 
about the progress of implementation of the treaty’s 
disarmament obligation and the inadequacies of the 
existing nuclear disarmament machinery.77
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3.2.  INTERNATIONAL LAW OFFERS 
AN EFFECTIVE FRAMEWORK TO 
PREVENT THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR 
WAR AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
While nuclear arsenals have declined since the end of 
the Cold War, carbon emissions are still going up and 
it is not clear when or if a peak will be reached. Since 
the early 1960s, a number of arms control agreements 
have been achieved: INF (Intermediate-Range Nucle-
ar Forces) and START Treaties, the Moscow Treaty 
(SORT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nu-
clear Weapons-Free Zones, Conventional Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Treaty, Chemical Weapons Convention, 
Biological Weapons Convention, Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Muni-
tions. With the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer, international law was 
extended to the atmosphere. While the goal of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) to stabilise carbon concentrations 
in the atmosphere at non-dangerous levels is far from 
being achieved, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol specified 
short-term emission goals for industrialised coun-
tries and introduced several instruments. However, 
most countries failed to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to the 1990 levels. Voluntary declarations 
are insufficient to stay within a maximum tempera-
ture change of two degrees Celsius above pre-indus-
trial levels and achieve an 80 percent emission re-
duction by the middle of the century, which for many 
experts is essential to stabilise the climate. While 
this does not exclude a number of risks, it is meant as 
a barrier against the potentially more dramatic risks 
at higher temperatures. To act on a global level, the 
international community has to agree on a maximum 
carbon budget for the whole planet that does not ex-
ceed the temperature ceiling, and then allocate ad-
missible emission pathways to individual countries 
within the budget limit according to principles of jus-
tice.78 What justice means in this context is heavily 
contested.
Among the short-term steps for nuclear arms con-
trol are further US-Russian cooperation on strategic 
arms reductions and a multilateral Fissile Material 
Cut-Off treaty on nuclear weapons materials. Similar-
ly, a number of adaptation and mitigation measures 
have been proposed for reductions of GHG emissions, 
which need to be implemented. However, an incre-
mental approach alone will not solve the problems in 
either field in the foreseeable future. Besides develop-
ing political and legal regimes in both the nuclear and 
climate policy arena, an integrative framework can 
help to combine various steps in a coherent approach 
to move toward a “double zero” of nuclear weapons 
and carbon emissions.79 A comprehensive approach 
in each field is not only wise, it is legally required. 
Nuclear disarmament and climate protection both 
involve implementation of general legal obligations 
setting a framework for action contained in interna-
tional legal agreements, such as the NPT, UN General 
Assembly Resolutions on nuclear disarmament and 
the UNFCCC.
In the case of nuclear weapons, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ), in an unanimous conclusion, 
clarified that Article VI of the NPT and other inter-
national law obligates states “to pursue in good faith 
and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nu-
clear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and 
effective international control.”80 At the present time 
there are no negotiations relating to nuclear disarma-
ment.81 Indeed, aside from modest US-Russian bilat-
eral agreements on reductions, that has been the case 
for many years, dating back to the 1996 CTBT. More 
than forty-five years after the NPT entered into force, 
and nearly 20 years after the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, 
it is time for a multilateral process to negotiate and 
achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weap-
ons, a process that would encompass measures like 
further US-Russian reductions and fissile materials 
agreement but not be limited to them. 
For comparison, the UNFCCC sets as the “ultimate 
objective” the “stabilization of greenhouse gas con-
centrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-caused] 
interference with the climate system.”82 It sets out 
general obligations, including that each developed 
state party “shall adopt national policies and take 
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corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate 
change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”83 It also en-
visages further cooperative action, including the 
adoption of additional agreements; the Kyoto Pro-
tocol is an example of such an agreement, as is the 
agreement reached at the Paris Conference. The Par-
is Agreement was adopted under the UNFCCC and 
through its provisions on limiting global average 
warming to well below 2°C aims to achieve the UN-
FCCC’s objective of stabilisation of greenhouse gas 
concentrations at safe levels. The agreement is part-
ly legally binding and partly voluntary. Countries are 
required to communicate “intended nationally de-
termined contributions” (INDCs) to mitigation of and 
adaptation to climate change which will be regularly 
reviewed. However, meeting the goals set in the IN-
DCs is not legally required. Crucially, this means that 
targets set for domestic emissions reduction are not 
legally binding. In addition, there are no penalties for 
non-compliance with the agreement. 
In both arenas, in particular with respect to the NPT, 
the UNFCCC, and the Paris Agreement, states must 
act in accordance with the fundamental legal prin-
ciple pacta sunt servanda: a treaty is legally binding 
and must be performed in good faith. In future nucle-
ar and climate negotiations undertaken pursuant to 
existing obligations, good faith also requires among 
other things awareness of the interests of other par-
ties; a persevering quest for an acceptable compro-
mise, with a willingness to contemplate modification 
of one’s own position; and no undue delay or prolon-
gation of the process. Finally, good faith requires that 
states refrain from actions that undermine achieve-
ment of agreed objectives, a requirement hard to rec-
oncile with nuclear-armed states’ plans to maintain 
their nuclear arsenals indefinitely and with many 
states’ plans for ongoing reliance on fossil energy 
technologies causing massive climate risk.
To turn rhetoric into concrete actions, non-govern-
mental organizations have made specific propos-
als for comprehensive solutions in both the nucle-
ar and climate fields. The Model Nuclear Weapons 
Convention, drafted in 1997 and updated in 2007 by an 
international group of experts, outlines a path to glob-
al zero.84 It does not include a ban on nuclear power, 
although it is recognised that the goal of nuclear abo-
lition would be easier to achieve and verify with such 
a ban than in a world where nuclear power continues 
to be pursued.85 A model treaty for drastic emission 
reductions was presented by NGOs in preparation of 
the 2009 climate summit in Copenhagen, but unfortu-
nately did little in influencing the outcome. To make 
progress, it is the major powers that have to commit 
to drastic reductions in emissions and nuclear weap-
ons. Without their serious involvement, a world free 
of both these scourges will remain elusive.
3.3.  USING LITIGATION 
TO ENSURE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
CLIMATE CHANGE OBLIGATIONS 
In another effort to stimulate progress in the nuclear 
sphere, non-nuclear weapon states, supported by civil 
society, have resorted to litigation. A major landmark 
in international law as well in the nuclear weapons 
sphere, the 1996 International Court of Justice Advi-
sory Opinion on the legality of threat or use of nuclear 
weapons resulted from a request of the UN General 
Assembly, supported by a world-wide coalition of 
non-governmental groups numbering more than 600, 
Figure 16: The International Court of Justice  
in session (Source: UN Photo/ICJ-CIJ)
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and hotly contested by nuclear weapon states. Since 
then civil society groups have proposed that the Gen-
eral Assembly make another request for an Advisory 
Opinion, this time on the legal implications of the nu-
clear disarmament obligation contained in the NPT 
and articulated by the Court in its Advisory Opinion. 
So far the General Assembly has not taken that step. 
However, in 2014 the Republic of the Marshall Islands 
filed applications in the ICJ against the nine nucle-
ar-armed states (US, UK, France, Russia, China, India, 
Pakistan, Israel, North Korea), claiming that they are 
in breach of obligations relating to nuclear disarma-
ment under the NPT and under customary interna-
tional law applying to all states.86 Cases are proceed-
ing against the three of the nuclear-armed states that 
have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, 
the UK, India, and Pakistan. These are contentious 
cases, in which judgments are binding on the parties. 
If judgments on the merits are issued, they will clar-
ify key issues, including whether states are required 
now, not in the distant future, to pursue and engage 
in multilateral negotiations on the abolition of nucle-
ar weapons, and whether modernization of arsenals 
is contrary to good faith compliance with the disar-
mament obligations. The Marshall Islands also filed 
a companion case against the United States alone in 
a US court; that case was dismissed on the ground 
that its resolution was not within the authority of the 
court, a decision now on appeal.
Litigation has also been sought to ensure that poli-
cies are adopted to curb dangerous climate change. 
In the Netherlands, the NGO Urgenda, together with 
nine hundred co-plaintiffs, initiated legal action 
against the Government in 2013 for failing to take suf-
ficient measures to reduce the country’s green-house 
gas emissions within targets set by IPCC to help avoid 
critical 2°C rise in global temperatures.87 The initia-
tors of the case argue that the action is supported by 
the ‘Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obliga-
tions’,88 which were agreed by an international group 
of eminent lawyers in April 2015, and note that states 
on the basis of tort law and human rights (among oth-
ers) are already legally accountable for emissions of 
greenhouse gasses from their own territories. A dis-
trict court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, noting that 
the State has a legal obligation to protect its citizens, 
and is therefore required to take the necessary pre-
cautions. The court ordered the Netherlands to reduce 
its CO2 emissions by a minimum of 25% (compared to 
1990) by 2020.89 The Dutch Government has appealed 
the decision. This is the first time that a judge has 
legally required a State to take precautions against 
climate change and this precedent is already being 
used in legal action in other countries, including in 
Belgium, where a similar case has been filed. 
There is other evidence of the judiciary becoming 
more active on climate change. In Pakistan, a farm-
er sued the national government for failure to carry 
out the 2012 National Climate Policy and Framework. 
The Lahore High Court ruled on 14 September 2015 
that, “On a legal and constitutional plane this is clar-
ion call for the protection of fundamental rights of 
the citizens of Pakistan, in particular, the vulnerable 
and weak segments of the society who are unable 
to approach this Court.”90 The court found that “the 
delay and lethargy of the State in implementing the 
Framework offend the fundamental rights of the cit-
izens.”91 The court therefore directed several govern-
ment ministries to each nominate “a climate change 
focal person” to help ensure the implementation of 
the Framework, and to present a list of action points 
by 31 December 2015. The court also created a Climate 
Change Commission with representatives of key 
ministries, NGOs, and technical experts.92
In the United States, a series of lawsuits have been 
filed by young people at the state and federal level 
to enforce the ‘Public Trust duty’ of government to 
protect natural resources, including the atmosphere, 
for the benefit of all present and future generations. 
These ‘Atmospheric Trust Legal Actions’ have been 
coordinated and supported by the NGO Our Chil-
dren’s Trust. In November 2015, a landmark decision 
was made in the case against the US Washington 
State Ecology Department, which requested that the 
department writes a carbon emissions rule that pro-
tects the atmosphere for the youths’ generation and 
those to come. In response, the Washington Court 
recognised constitutional and public trust rights, an-
nouncing the legal duty to protect the atmosphere for 
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present and future generations. Judge Hill declared 
that “[the youths’] very survival depends upon the will 
of their elders to act now, decisively and unequivocal-
ly, to stem the tide of global warming… before doing so 
becomes first too costly and then too late.”93 The court 
held that “[t]he state has a constitutional obligation to 
protect the public’s interest in natural resources held 
in trust for the common benefit of the people.”94 
As part of the same campaign, on 12 August 2015, 
young people from across the United States filed a 
constitutional climate change lawsuit against the 
federal government in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon. The Complaint asserts that, in 
causing climate change, the federal government has 
violated the youngest generation’s constitutional 
rights to life, liberty, and property, and has failed to 
protect essential public trust resources. The plaintiffs 
seek a court order requiring the President to immedi-
ately implement a national plan to decrease atmos-
pheric concentrations of CO2 to a safe level: 350 ppm 
by the year 2100. In a historic decision, on 8 April 2016 
the Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. In decid-
ing the case would proceed, Judge Coffin noted that, 
“the intractability of the debates before Congress and 
state legislatures and the alleged valuing of short 
term economic interest despite the cost to human 
life, necessitates a need for the courts to evaluate the 
constitutional parameters of the action or inaction 
taken by the government.”95
There have also been some signs that climate litiga-
tion will be pursued at the international level. In 2011, 
the Pacific Island State of Palau announced in the 
UN General Assembly that it would seek an Adviso-
ry Opinion from the International Court of Justice on 
the topic of climate change damage, more specifically 
by asking the ICJ to provide guidance on how the ‘no 
harm rule’ and the UN Law of the Sea Convention ap-
ply to climate change damage.96 Another element of 
a request for an advisory opinion could concern the 
legal implications of the framework obligations set 
forth in the UNFCCC and whether states are in com-
pliance with those obligations. There has also been 
some discussion in academic and diplomatic circles 
about the possibility of filing contentious proceedings 
at the ICJ against major polluters for the effects of cli-
mate change.97 To date, neither a contentious case nor 
an Advisory Opinion has been sought.
3.4.  SCIENTISTS HAVE A SPECIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ELIMINATING 
THE RISKS OF FOSSIL ENERGY 
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Since scientists and engineers invented the tech-
nologies to exploit fossil energy and nuclear power, 
they have a special responsibility in abolishing both. 
With the advent of nuclear weapons, physicists took 
the responsibility in calling for nuclear disarmament. 
As the Russell-Einstein Manifesto notes: “In view of 
the fact that in any future world war nuclear weap-
ons will certainly be employed, and that such weap-
ons threaten the continued existence of mankind, we 
urge the governments of the world to realize, and to 
acknowledge publicly, that their purpose cannot be 
furthered by a world war, and we urge them, conse-
quently, to find peaceful means for the settlement of 
all matters of dispute between them.”98  
Joseph Rotblat refused to continue working on the 
Manhattan Project to build the atomic bomb when he 
learned that the bomb was no longer needed against 
Hitler. He called for the moral responsibility of sci-
entists: “The time has come to formulate guidelines 
for the ethical conduct of scientists, perhaps in the 
form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath. This would be 
particularly valuable for young scientists when they 
embark on a scientific career ... I appeal to my fellow 
scientists to remember their responsibility to human-
ity.”99 In conjunction with the Pugwash Conferences, 
he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for his 
efforts towards nuclear disarmament. The Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change, together with Al 
Gore, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007 for their 
efforts in studying and educating on man-made cli-
mate change.100
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Because of their expertise, scientists and engineers 
can make major contributions to abolishing the nu-
clear arsenals (e.g., by verifying the disarmament pro-
cess), as well as develop the technologies necessary 
for a sustainable energy transition that would avoid 
further human-induced global warming. The chal-
lenge to avoid dangerous climate change could foster 
the readiness for cooperation, on local and global lev-
els. And a push toward nuclear disarmament could 
help transform the international security landscape 
into a more peaceful and sustainable world order.
TO ESTABLISH A FOUNDATION 
FOR PEACE THAT PREVENTS 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND NUCLEAR 
WAR, IT IS CRUCIAL TO DEVELOP 
AND ESTABLISH THE CONCEPTS 
OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY 
AND SUSTAINABLE PEACE
If the nuclear and climate problems are not tackled 
comprehensively but remain stuck in piecemeal ap-
proaches, one problem could impede solving the oth-
er. As long as countries acquire nuclear power and 
nuclear weapons, arms races and threat perceptions 
could spoil international relations, which in turn 
could undermine the conditions for cooperative cli-
mate policies (including the development of global 
emission standards and goals, ensuring the use of 
appropriate renewable energy technologies, maxim-
ising the effectiveness and sharing of research, and 
energy ‘sharing’ to minimise wastage). On the other 
hand it could induce cooperation on addressing a 
host of other transnational crises, such as demo-
graphic changes, refugee movements, pandemic dis-
ease, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, 
extreme poverty and migration. On the other hand, 
progressing climate change could undermine human 
and international security, causing incentives to use 
violent means to protect resources and interests. To 
avoid such a doomsday scenario, it is essential to 
strengthen the positive linkages between both policy 
areas. Negotiations on roadmaps for nuclear disar-
mament and carbon emission reduction could over-
come the stalemate in both areas. 
Regional approaches could help to trigger global 
solutions, such as establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free 
Zones (NWFZs), starting in regions with complex 
security environments, including the Middle East, 
Northeast Asia and the Arctic. With regard to the 
proposal to establish a NWFZ in the Arctic, the denu-
clearisation (and possible demilitarisation) of the 
Arctic could improve conditions for further environ-
mental protection and safeguards in the region. Such 
an initiative could be modelled on the 1959 Antarctic 
Treaty, which demilitarised and denuclearised the 
South Pole and introduced a range of agreements on 
protection of the environment and conservation of 
species in the region, making it “a natural reserve, de-
voted to peace and science.”101 Regional partnerships 
in environmental security could prevent disasters in 
climate hot spots and support the capacity building 
of societies against the risks of climate change. In a 
win-win scenario, progress on nuclear disarmament 
would improve the conditions for climate coopera-
tion, which, in turn, would support an international 
political climate that would make nuclear weapons 
increasingly obsolete. 
In line with this, renewable energy technologies pro-
vide alternatives to this struggle. By harnessing lo-
cal renewable energy sources, jurisdictions increase 
their political and energy independency, while the 
degree of local and international cooperation needed 
for the transition to 100% renewable energy can act 
as a catalyst for such cooperation in tackling other 
transnational security threats. This helps solving 
geopolitical crises, avoid future armed conflicts trig-
gered by climate instability and resource scarcity, 
and build co-operative security mechanisms.
The financial resources needed for this are available. 
Part of the money that would be freed up by stopping 
investments in nuclear weapons—around $100 billion 
a year102 —as well as the roughly $5 trillion spent annu-
ally on global fossil fuel subsidies103 (equivalent to $10 
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million a minute every day) and the high subsidies 
for nuclear power, could be redirected toward invest-
ment in renewable energy research and development 
as well as other social and economic programmes in 
all countries.
Ultimately, preventing the dangers of climate change 
and nuclear war in the long run requires an integrated 
set of strategies that address the causes as well as the 
impacts on the natural and social environment. New 
concepts of security could serve as building blocks 
for a more peaceful world, including common securi-
ty (pursuing common responses to common threats), 
ecological security (preventing environmental prob-
lems from turning into security risks), human secu-
rity (shielding and empowering people against acute 
threats) and global security (protection of the whole 
planet against common threats).104 Satisfying human 
needs and harnessing human capabilities makes so-
cieties more resistant to climate change and allows 
them to implement low-carbon energy alternatives 
and conflict-resolution mechanisms. Both require 
the creation of institutions that ensure the benefits of 
cooperation via establishing and enforcing common 
rules and regulations. Reducing poverty and imple-
menting human rights would significantly strength-
en human security and build problem-solving capa-
bilities. Less wealthy countries need development 
cooperation and international financial assistance, 
e.g., by effectively using micro-finance. North-South 
transitions towards a “Green New Deal”105 would pro-
vide the framework for the financial and technology 
transfer required to build a low-carbon society that 
tackles the challenges of energy security, climate 
change and human development at the same time. 
To face both nuclear risks and climate change, it is 
important to create sustainable lifecycles and liveli-
hoods that respect the capabilities of the living world. 
It is crucial to evade the vicious cycle of unsustain-
able economic growth, unchecked accumulation of 
political power and escalation of violence that for too 
long have contributed to environmental destruction, 
underdevelopment and war. Instead of such a “cli-
mate of violence” strategies are required that sup-
port a “new climate for peace”106 and build a “virtuous 
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Figure 16: Links between nuclear and climate risks  
(Source: Scheffran 2011)
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cycle” that transforms the current world disorder into 
a more peaceful, sustainable and viable world order.107 
To avoid conflicts related to the scarcity of natural re-
sources, or at least reduce their destructive effects, a 
bundle of measures is required that is not limited to 
the traditional means of conflict management, such 
as military intervention, arms control, refugee sup-
port and disaster operations.
A world that is violent and unpeaceful is at the same 
time unsustainable und unjust, and vice versa. Strat-
egies for preventing the causes of violent conflict in-
tegrate a set of measures, including the preservation 
and efficient use of natural resources, implement-
ing principles of equity and justice, strengthening 
cooperation and changing lifestyles. Accordingly, 
concepts of peace that rely on avoiding dangerous 
conflict, on preventive arms control, the reduction of 
violence and the abolition of nuclear weapons, and on 
compliance with human rights and cooperation, will 
improve the conditions for the co-operative imple-
mentation of sustainable development. The inherent 
linkages need to be further developed in a mutually 
stimulating way to an integrated concept of sustain-
able peace.108 
There will be no role for nuclear weapons in a peaceful 
and sustainable world. On the contrary: they prevent 
it because they are based on principles fundamental-
ly violating the conditions for peace and sustainable 
development. The world should eliminate and pro-
hibit these weapons that symbolise so badly the last 
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